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Abstract
Infrequent price changes at the ￿rm level are now well documented in the
literature. However, a number of issues remain partly unaddressed. This paper
contributes to the literature on price stickiness by investigating the lags of price
adjustments to di⁄erent types of shocks. We ￿nd that adjustment lags to cost and
demand shocks vary with ￿rm characteristics, namely the ￿rm￿ s cost structure, the
type of pricing policy, and the type of good. We also document that ￿rms react
asymmetrically to demand and cost shocks, as well as to positive and negative
shocks, and that the degree and direction of the asymmetry varies across ￿rms.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Price stickiness has a central role in macroeconomics and, besides a vast theoretical
literature, it has generated numerous empirical studies trying to explain its origins and
gauge its importance.1 A consensual ￿nding of this work is that prices at the micro
level may remain unchanged for periods that can last up to several months. Studies
documenting this stylised fact include, among many others, Bils and Klenow (2004),
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), and Nakamura and Steinson (2008), who study consumer
prices in the United States (US), and Dhyne et al. (2006) and Vermeulen et al. (2007),
who give a synthesis of studies carried out for the Euro Area (EA). For example, using
comparable micro data on consumer prices, Dhyne et al. (2006) ￿nd that the estimated
monthly frequency of price changes is around 15 percent in the EA and 25 percent in
the US, and that the implied average duration of a price spell is 13 months in the EA
and 6.7 months in the US. These results are consistent with evidence from survey data:
according to Fabiani et al. (2006), the median frequency of price changes is one per year
in the EA, lower than the estimated 1.4 price changes per year in the US reported in
Blinder et al. (1998).
The empirical literature investigating the reasons for such infrequent price changes at
the ￿rm-level is, however, scanter. Dhyne et al. (2008) have recently made an important
contribution to the understanding of this phenomenon by distinguishing between ￿in-
trinsic price rigidity￿(price rigidity that is inherent to the price-setting mechanism), and
￿extrinsic rigidity￿(price rigidity that is induced by a low degree of volatility of shocks
to the marginal cost and/or the desired mark-up). They ￿nd that the di⁄erences across
products in the frequency of price changes do not strictly correspond to di⁄erences in
intrinsic price rigidity, i.e., the frequency of price changes also depends, in a signi￿cant
way, on the frequency and magnitude of the shocks to the unobserved optimal price.
Thus, as Blinder (1991, p. 94) puts it: ￿From the point of view of macroeconomic theory,
frequency of price change may not be the right question to ask, for it depends as much
1See, among many others, Taylor (1980), Calvo (1983), Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983), Caplin
and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel (1993, 2007), Caplin and Leahy (1991, 1997), Danziger (1999),
Dotsey et al. (1999), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), and Woodford (2009).
2on the frequency of shocks as on the ￿rms￿pricing strategies. We are more interested
to know how long price adjustments lag behind shocks to demand and cost.￿
Therefore, rather than looking into the reasons for infrequent price changes, as done
in most of the previous literature on price stickiness (see, e.g., Munnick and Xu, 2007,
Vermeulen et al., 2007, Dhyne et al., 2006, and the references therein), in this paper we
directly investigate the deeper and more meaningful question of the determinants of the
speed of price adjustments to demand and cost shocks. In particular, we use survey data
on price adjustment lags reported by Portuguese ￿rms to investigate how they adjust
their prices in response to changes in market conditions. The advantage of using such
data is that, in order to study the intrinsic price rigidity, we do not need to match price
changes decisions with market conditions, which is usually a di¢ cult task.
Other papers have studied the speed of price reactions to demand and costs shocks;
see, e.g., Kwapil et al. (2004) for Austria, Loupias and Ricart (2004) for France, Alvarez
and Hernando (2005) for Spain, Fabiani et al. (2004) for Italy, and Small and Yates
(1999) for the United Kingdom. However, a major distinguishing feature of our approach
is that we use much more detailed information on the speed of price adjustments, and
consequently we are able to identify more precisely the e⁄ect of the covariates in our
model. Speci￿cally, we explore the available information on price adjustment lags using
a six-categories panel-ordered probit model to study the link between price adjustment
lags and various ￿rm characteristics. This type of model provides great e¢ ciency gains
relatively to the binary models commonly used in the literature.
There are also other dimensions in which our dataset set is richer than those previously
used to investigate price-stickiness. In particular, we have detailed data on an extensive
list of characteristics of more that 900 ￿rms and on the reaction time of each ￿rm to four
types of shock. In total, therefore, we can use more that 3600 observations on a varied
set of ￿rms. Naturally, this also increases the precision of our estimates, allowing us to
identify signi￿cant e⁄ects of regressors that often appear as not statistically signi￿cant
in previous studies. It is also worth pointing out that, unlike previous studies in the area,
we investigate not only the statistical signi￿cance of the regressors, but we also compute
marginal e⁄ects on probabilities to gauge the economic relevance of each covariate.
3A potential disadvantage of the type of data we use is that it does not distinguish
between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, the economic literature has stressed
that the reaction of ￿rms to shocks may depend on whether these are aggregate or
idiosyncratic (Lucas, 1973), and recently Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) developed
a model in which ￿rms￿prices react quickly to idiosyncratic shocks, but only slowly
to aggregate shocks. The fact that our data has no information on whether the ￿rm
sees the shock as aggregate or idiosyncratic is an important limitation of our data.2 In
any case, we do not expect this fact to seriously limit the interpretation of our results
because, since we have four observations of each ￿rm, our panel data model will to some
extent account for the heterogeneity resulting from ￿rms interpreting the nature of the
shock in di⁄erent ways.
In this paper we tackle several interesting questions. Do prices respond with di⁄erent
lags to demand and cost shocks? Do prices respond di⁄erently to shocks implying a price
increase than to shocks implying a price decrease? Does the cost structure matter for
price stickiness? Are prices stickier when a ￿rm operates in a less competitive industry?
Does price stickiness depend on how long ￿rms have been dealing with their customers?
Is the services sector structurally di⁄erent from the manufacturing sector?
We ￿nd that adjustment lags to cost and demand shocks (either positive or negative),
vary signi￿cantly with ￿rm characteristics such as the cost structure, type of pricing
policy, and the type of good, among others. Interestingly, and in contrast to what one
could expect, measures of the importance of explicit and implicit contracts ￿two of the
most cited sticky-price theories in ￿rms￿surveys ￿do not emerge as having signi￿cant
implications for the speed of price reaction to demand or cost shocks. Overall, these
results are consistent with the idea that di⁄erences in price stickiness across ￿rms depend
on the sensitivity of their pro￿ts to deviations from the optimal price and on the costs
of changing nominal prices. The evidence also suggests that ￿rms react di⁄erently to
2Another potential disadvantage of this type of data is that these are reported, not actual, lags and
it is impossible to know whether the answers provided are close to reality. However, the fact that in our
model we only use the ordinal information in the answers given by the ￿rms will signi￿cantly mitigate
potential measurement errors.
4demand and cost shocks, as well as to positive and negative shocks, and that the degree
and direction of these asymmetries vary with the characteristics of the ￿rms.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background which underlies the estimated model. Section 3 describes the novel dataset
used in the paper and presents the results of a preliminary data analysis. Section
4 presents the estimated model and discusses the main results. Section 5 contains
some concluding remarks and, ￿nally, two appendices provide technical details on the
speci￿cation and estimation of the econometric model used in the empirical part of this
paper, as well as an explanation of how the di⁄erent variables were constructed.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Individual ￿rms do not continuously adjust their prices in response to shocks that hit
the economy. To model this fact, the economic literature considers mainly two types of
pricing behaviour: time dependent and state dependent pricing rules. According to the
former, ￿rms are assumed to change their prices periodically using either a deterministic
(Taylor, 1980) or a stochastic (Calvo, 1983) process of price adjustment, i.e., the timing
of the price changes is exogenous and does not depend either on the state of the economy
or on the timing of the shocks.
Firms following state-dependent pricing rules are usually assumed to review their
prices whenever relevant shocks hit the economy but, due to the existence of ￿xed costs
of changing prices (e.g., the cost of printing and distributing new price lists), they change
their prices only when the di⁄erence between the actual and target prices is large enough
(see, for example, Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977, Caplin and Spulber, 1987, Caballero and
Engel, 1993, Dotsey et al., 1999). Thus, a company facing these menu costs will change
its price less frequently than an otherwise identical ￿rm without such costs.
Some authors have, however, argued that the main bene￿t of infrequent price changes
is not lower menu costs, but reduction of the costs associated with information collection
and decision-making. Obtaining this bene￿t necessarily means that the timing of the
occasions upon which prices are reconsidered may be largely independent of current
market conditions (see Woodford, 2003, Zbaracki et al., 2004). In the same vein, Ball
5and Mankiw (1994a) argue that ￿the most important costs of price adjustment are the
time and attention required of managers to gather the relevant information and to make
and implement decisions.￿
In addition to menu costs and/or information costs, economic theory has suggested
a large number of other potential explanations for the existence of price rigidities, of
which the theories of explicit and/or implicit contracts, cost-based pricing, coordination
failure, and pricing thresholds, are notable examples.
With explicit contracts, ￿rms aim at building long-term relationships with their cus-
tomer in order to stabilise their future sales. Customers, on the other hand, are attracted
by a constant price because it makes their future costs more predictable and helps to
minimize transaction costs (e.g., shopping time). In turn, the theory of implicit con-
tracts is based on the idea that ￿rms try to win customer loyalty by changing prices
as little as possible. The idea that explicit contracts may be central for price stickiness
was ￿rst introduced in the economic literature through wage contracts (see, for instance,
Fisher, 1977), while the idea of implicit contracts goes back to Okun (1981), who dis-
tinguishes between price increases due to cost shocks and those that are due to demand
shocks. He argues that higher costs are an accepted rationale for rising prices, while
increases in demand are viewed as unfair. Consequently, ￿rms hold prices constant in
the face of demand shocks, as they do not want to jeopardise customer relations. The
idea that consumers wish to buy from ￿rms whose prices are ￿fair￿is also stressed, for
example, by Rotemberg (2005) and Anderson and Simester (2010).
Rather than emphasizing the ￿rm-customer relation, the theory of coordination failure
focuses on the interaction between ￿rms as the explanation for sticky prices. Like in
the case of explicit contracts, the idea was ￿rst introduced for the analysis of the labour
market (see, for instance, Clower, 1965). After a shock, a ￿rm might want to change
its price, but only if the other ￿rms change their prices too. Without a coordinating
mechanism which allows the ￿rms to move together, the prices might remain unchanged.
As regards the cost-based pricing theory, the idea is that input costs are an important
determinant in ￿rms￿pricing decision, and that if costs do not change, prices will not
change either. Basically, this means that prices do not change because other prices
6(input costs) do not change (see Hall, 1986).3 Finally, some ￿rms set their prices at
psychologically attractive thresholds. This pricing strategy can cause price stickiness
because, in face of small shocks calling for small price changes, ￿rms might not react
and postpone price adjustments until new events justify a price change to the next
pricing threshold.
The di⁄erent sticky-price theories discussed above have informed most of the empirical
research on the existence and signi￿cance of infrequent price changes, and the present
work is no exception to this trend. A useful way of looking at these sticky-price theories
is to think of them as re￿ ecting the existence of both real and nominal rigidities. As Ball
and Romer (1990) noticed, nominal price stickiness depends not only on the costs of
changing nominal prices (nominal frictions) but also on the bene￿ts of changing prices
(real rigidities). Thus, as a general principle, we may expect that the less pro￿ts change
when ￿rms set their prices away from the optimum, the smaller will be the bene￿ts
from quickly adjusting towards the optimum, and vice-versa. In this paper we look
into the factors that may explain why some ￿rms adjust their prices more rapidly than
others. For that purpose, we will look into the factors that might re￿ ect di⁄erences
in the relative importance of the alternative sticky-price theories at the ￿rm-level, i.e.,
factors that might re￿ ect di⁄erences in the ￿rms￿adjustment costs, or that might be
expected to make pro￿ts more or less sensitive to sub-optimal prices.
3. THE DATA
3.1. Data sources
Most of the data used in this study come from a survey about price setting practices
carried out by the Banco de Portugal.4 In this survey, ￿rms were asked how long they
would take to react to signi￿cant cost and demand shocks. More speci￿cally, they were
asked the following four questions: 1) ￿After a signi￿cant increase in demand how much
time on average elapses before you raise your prices?￿ ; 2) ￿After a signi￿cant increase
3This reason for not changing prices relates directly to the concept of "extrinsic price rigidity"
introduced in Dhyne at al. (2008), and discussed above.
4For further details on this survey, see Martins (2010).
7in production costs how much time on average elapses before you raise your prices?￿ ; 3)
￿After a signi￿cant fall in demand, how much time on average elapses before you reduce
your prices?￿ ; and 4) ￿After a signi￿cant decline in production costs how much time
on average elapses before you reduce your prices?￿ . The responses to these questions,
which will be the dependent variable in our model, are recorded as continuous interval
data with six categories: 1 - less than one week; 2 - from one week to one month; 3 -
from one month to three months; 4 - from three to six months; 5 - from six months to
one year; 6 - the price remained unchanged. With the expression ￿signi￿cant increase￿
or ￿signi￿cant decline￿ the authors of the survey had in mind inducing respondents
to interpret the shock as signi￿cant enough to lead ￿rms to react to it by changing
their price. Therefore, we interpret option 6 as indicating that the price will eventually
change, but the adjustment lag is longer than one year.5
Besides the questions on price adjustments lags, the survey also contains information
on a large set of ￿rms￿characteristics. These include information on the main market
of the ￿rm (internal versus external market), main destinations of sales (wholesalers
vs. retailers, private vs. public sector), number of competitors, relations with customers
(long-term vs. short-term), type of product competition (price vs. quality, di⁄erentiation
vs. after sales service), price discrimination (same price for all customers vs. decided
on a case-by-case basis), price setting decisions (own company vs. external entity, main
customers vs. main competitors), and reasons for postponing price changes (the risk that
competitors do not follow, existence of implicit or written contracts, cost of changing
prices, costs of collecting information, absence of signi￿cant changes in variable costs,
preference for maintaining prices at psychological thresholds, etc.).
The information from the survey is supplemented with data from two other sources.
From Central de Balan￿os, a comprehensive dataset maintained by Banco de Portugal in
which the balance sheets and income statements of most Portuguese ￿rms are registered,
we obtain data on the number of employees, the share of sales that are made abroad, and
the shares of labour, inputs, and ￿nancial costs. Finally, we obtain information about
5As a robustness check, we also estimated models grouping categories 5 and 6 together and found
that the results change very little.
8the proportion of domestic and foreign capital of the ￿rm from Quadros de Pessoal,
a large administrative database collected by the Ministry of Employment and Social
Security, which, among other, includes information about all the Portuguese ￿rms with
wage earners (size, ownership, location, etc.).
By combining the three datasets through the individual tax identi￿cation number of
each ￿rm, we are able to obtain detailed information on 903 ￿rms from di⁄erent branches
of activity. More speci￿cally, our sample includes ￿rms with 20 or more employees, from
which almost 90 percent belong to Manufacturing (NACE - classi￿cation of economic
activities - 15 to 37) and the remaining to Services (NACE 60 to 64, 80 and 85 -
Transport, Storage and Communication, Education and Healthcare). Sectors such as
agriculture, construction, or wholesale and retail trade are not included.
3.2. Preliminary data analysis
As mentioned above, the four survey questions about price adjustment lags are our
variates of interest. Table 1 summarises the information on these variables by displaying
the distribution of the observed price adjustment lags for each type of shock. These
results suggest that, in general, ￿rms in the sample are quicker to react to cost shocks,
in particular when they are positive, than to demand shocks. For example, only around
10 percent of the ￿rms keep their prices unchanged in the ￿rst year after a positive
cost shock, while the fraction of ￿rms that hold their prices unchanged in response to
a positive demand shock is around 35 percent. Interestingly, ￿rms in the sample seem
to react more quickly to positive than to negative cost shocks, but to be slower to react
to positive than to negative demand shocks.6 Formal tests for the hypotheses that the
reaction time is the same both for positive and negative shocks, and for demand and
cost shocks, will be performed in the next section.
6Similar results concerning the relative speed of price adjustment to cost and demand shocks using
survey data were obtained for Austria, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Spain and the US (see, respectively,
Kwapil et al., 2004, Fabiani et al., 2004, Loupias and Ricart, 2004, L￿nnemann and Math￿, 2006,
Alvarez and Hernando, 2005, Blinder, 1998).
9Table 1: Speed of price response to demand and cost shocks
Cost shocks Demand shocks
Price adjustment lag Positive Negative Positive Negative
1 - less than one week 4.7 3.5 2.8 4.8
2 - from one week to one month 16.8 15.2 12.2 16.8
3 - from 1 month to 3 months 25.0 25.7 19.3 23.4
4 - from 3 to 6 months 17.6 15.0 13.4 13.7
5 - from 6 months to one year 26.3 21.2 17.7 14.0
6 - the price remained unchanged 9.6 19.5 34.7 27.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2: Percentage of ￿rms that do not change
their prices in the ￿rst year after the shock
Cost shocks Demand shocks
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Manufacturing 8.5 17.5 33.0 25.1
Services 20.0 37.8 50.0 47.8
Small ￿rms 9.0 18.7 35.2 27.1
Large ￿rms 13.5 24.1 31.6 28.6
Total 9.6 19.5 34.7 27.4
Small and large ￿rms are ￿rms with up to 250 employees and more than 250
employees, respectively. The percentages in the table are computed as a pro-
portion of the total number of ￿rms in the corresponding sector or ￿rm type.
The results of this preliminary analysis, however, are not informative about the pos-
sible e⁄ect of the characteristics of the ￿rms on the speed of adjustment, and may hide
important heterogeneity in ￿rms￿responses to shocks. As an illustration of the impor-
tance of this heterogeneity, Table 2 gives the breakdown by sector and ￿rm size of the
proportion of ￿rms that do not adjust the price in the ￿rst year after the shock. Clearly,
the speed of price adjustment varies with ￿rm sizes and across sectors. Naturally, all
10these ￿ndings will be taken into account in the econometric analysis we present in the
next section.
As in similar studies, the survey data also contains information on the reasons why
￿rms may delay price changes. Speci￿cally, ￿rms were asked to rank the main sticky-
price theories according to their importance in explaining why ￿rms sometimes avoid
or postpone price changes in the face of changes in the relevant economic environment.
Respondents were asked to indicate the degree of importance attached to each theory in
a scale ranging from 1 (unimportant) to 4 (very important). Table 3 summarises these
results by ranking theories by mean scores.
Table 3: Theories of price stickiness (mean scores)
Sectors Size
Theory Total Manufacturing Services Small Large
Implicit contracts 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.0
Coordination failure 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.8
Cost-based pricing 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.6
Explicit contracts 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.8
Temporary shock 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.5
Quality signal 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2
Menu costs 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.8
Costly information 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6
Pricing thresholds 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6
The results in Table 3 are in line with the ￿ndings of similar surveys. For example,
implicit contracts, explicit contracts, cost-based pricing and coordination failure, also
emerge as the top four theories for the EA (Fabiani et al., 2006), while coordination
failure, cost-based pricing, implicit contracts and explicit contracts rank ￿rst, second,
fourth and ￿fth, respectively, for the US (Blinder et al., 1998). Similar results were
obtained for Sweden (Apel et al., 2005) and the UK (Hall et al., 1997). The results
for the lower part of the ranking are also similar across countries. In these surveys,
menu costs and information costs systematically rank very poorly as explanations for
11price rigidities. For example, menu costs rank eighth and information costs ninth out of
ten alternative explanations in the EA (Fabiani et al., 2006), and similar results were
obtained for other countries such as the UK, Canada and Sweden (Hall et al., 1997,
Almirault et al., 2006, Apel et al., 2005).
In the literature, the rankings of sticky-price theories have been used either directly,
as a way of ranking the importance of the di⁄erent sticky-price theories (see, among
others, Fabiani et al., 2006, and the references therein), or indirectly through regression
analyses, to explain the frequency of price changes (see, for instance, Munnick and Xu,
2007). However, although these rankings provide evidence on the causes of the existence
of price adjustment lags, they tell us little about the length of the lags and on how these
vary across ￿rms, which is the main purpose of this paper. For this reason, in the model
to be presented in the next section, the rankings of the sticky-price theories as reported
by the ￿rms are not used as covariates. Rather, and for the reasons explained above, we
will look into the factors that might re￿ ect di⁄erences in the relative importance of the
alternative sticky-price theories at the ￿rm-level by identifying the factors that might
a⁄ect the ￿rms￿adjustment costs, or that are expected to a⁄ect the sensitivity of pro￿ts
to deviations from the optimal price.
4. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR PRICE ADJUSTMENT LAGS
The model we use to gauge the impacts of the di⁄erent covariates on the lags of price
adjustments takes into account both the interval nature of the data and the fact that
each ￿rm contributes to the sample with four observations. Speci￿cally, we model the
latent variable yi;j, which represents the time ￿rm i takes to react to a shock of type j,
as a function of a set of ￿rm characteristics and of a ￿rm-speci￿c random-e⁄ect. Because
yi;j is not fully observable, and due to the potential existence of reporting errors, our
model uses only the ordinal information provided by the ￿rms.7 That is, the dependent
variable in our model is e yi;j = m, where m = 1;2;::;6 indicates one of the six possible
7Because the lags of price adjustments are reported in the form of known time intervals, one could
have used this information to estimate an interval-regression model with known cut-o⁄ parameters.
However, we do not follow this approach as it would require much stronger assumptions on the functional
12response categories. We therefore use a panel-ordered probit model that allows for the
presence of unobserved ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects.8
Because the preliminary data analysis suggests that the speed of price adjustment
is shock speci￿c, we estimate a model which allows for the possibility of di⁄erent co-
e¢ cients for each type of shock, including di⁄erent cut-o⁄ parameters and di⁄erent
variances for the non-observed stochastic components. This is almost equivalent to esti-
mating four di⁄erent models, one for each type of shock, with the di⁄erence being that
in our case the models are linked by the unobserved heterogeneity component, which is
assumed to be common to the four shocks.9 A more detailed description of the model
is provided in Appendix A.
To complete the model speci￿cation it is necessary to de￿ne the set of regressors to
use. As mentioned above, this choice was guided by the literature on the sticky-price
theories brie￿ y reviewed in Section 2. Ultimately, the importance of the di⁄erent sticky-
price theories at the ￿rm-level may be captured by the characteristics of the ￿rm itself,
the good that is produced, or the sector in which the ￿rm operates. For this reason, we
have chosen as regressors sectoral, product, and ￿rm-level characteristics, that may be
related directly to the above discussed sticky-price theories, or may be expected to make
pro￿ts more or less sensitive to shocks. Appendix B describes the di⁄erent regressors
and provides some summary statistics.
form of the model (see further details in Appendix A). Instead, we opted for estimating the cut-o⁄
parameters freely in the context of a very general ordered probit model.
8To the best of our knowledge, all the papers in the empirical literature that have looked at the
speed of price reactions to demand and costs shocks have estimated binary probit models. As men-
tioned before, being able to use much more detailed data on the speed of price adjustments is a major
distinguishing feature of our work, and the model we use explores more fully the richness of the data
than the simple probit models used so far in the literature.
9Qualitatively, the results do not change if the model is estimated without the random e⁄ects or
assuming that the random e⁄ects are independent across the four equations.
134.1 Estimation results
Table 4 presents the results of the estimated model,10 and Table 5 reports the marginal
e⁄ects of the covariates on the probability that the price adjustment does not take place
in the ￿rst year after the shock.11 Speci￿cally, the ￿rst line of Table 5 reports the
estimated probability, for a ￿rm in the reference group, that the price adjustment does
not take place in the ￿rst year after the shock, and the remaining lines give the change
to this probability from setting to 1 the corresponding regressor. These di⁄erences to
the baseline group, for a generic covariate d and shock j (j = 1;:::;4), are computed as
Pr[e yi;j = 6j x = 0;d = 1] ￿ Pr[e yi;j = 6j x = 0;d = 0], where x denotes the ￿xed values
of all other covariates in the model.
For ease of presentation we grouped the covariates in our model into the following
six categories: 1) Price setting practices, 2) Cost structure, 3) Market environment, 4)
Source of competitiveness, 5) Type of good, and 6) Other characteristics.
10Given the de￿nition of the categorical variables (see Appendix B), the reference or baseline group is
composed of ￿rms for which: a) the proportion of sales under written contracts is less than 50 percent;
b) the relationship with customers is essentially of a short-term nature; c) the price charged is the
same for all customers (absence of price discrimination) and there are no quantity discount prices; d)
the price of the product is set by the ￿rm itself and not by an external entity, including the main
competitors or main customers; e) the share of labour and input costs are below the corresponding
median share; f) the number of competitors is less than 5; g) exports represent more than 50 percent of
their main product sales; h) price, quality and delivery time are not considered very important factors
for the competitiveness of the main product; i) the sector of activity is manufacturing; j) the production
is essentially for ￿nal consumption (the main destination market is composed of wholesalers, retailers
or ￿nal consumers), as opposed to intermediate consumption; k) the number of employees is equal or
less than 250, and l) the share of domestic capital is equal or less than 50 percent.
11It is well-known (see, e.g., Winkelmann and Boes, 2006) that in models for ordered data the signs
of the partial e⁄ects of the covariates are unambiguous only for the ￿rst and last category (e yi;j = 1
and e yi;j = 6, in our case). For the intermediate categories, it is possible to see how a covariate changes
the probability of a ￿rm being in a given category, but that is not informative about whether that
variable has a positive or negative impact on the value of the underlying latent variable. We focus on
the category e yi;j = 6 (i.e., price adjustment does not take place in the ￿rst year after the shock), as it
is more meaningful than the category e yi;j = 1 (i.e., price adjustment takes place in the ￿rst week after
the shock).
14Table 4: Panel-ordered probit estimates for the price adjustment lags
Cost shocks Demand shocks




























































































































































































Standard errors computed from analytical second derivatives are in parenthesis; **marks
signi￿cance at 5%; *marks signi￿cance at 10% level; ￿k;j (k = 2;:::;5) are the cut-o⁄
parameters, and ￿j is the shock-speci￿c impact of the random-e⁄ects (see Appendix A
for details).
15Table 5: Probability estimates for the category e yij = 6 for the
baseline group, and di⁄erences with respect to this group
Cost shocks Demand shocks


















































































































































Standard errors computed from analytical second derivatives are in parenthesis; **marks
signi￿cance at 5%; *marks signi￿cance at 10% level.
Price setting practices
This category includes six regressors deemed to a⁄ect directly the ability of the ￿rm to
change its price in the event of a shock: the proportion of sales under written contracts,
information on whether the relation with the customers is essentially of a long- or short-
term nature, information on whether the ￿rm practices price discrimination and/or
16quantity discounts, and, ￿nally, information on whether the price is signi￿cantly a⁄ected
by the ￿rm￿ s main customers or main competitors.
The ￿rst variable measures how important explicit contracts are for ￿rms￿regular op-
erations, while the second may be seen as a proxy for the existence of implicit contracts.
As we have seen in Section 2, economic theory suggests that the existence of explicit
and/or implicit contracts may be an important source of price stickiness, and the results
in Section 3 con￿rm that indeed this is an important reason for the existence price ad-
justment lags. In contradistinction, the results in Table 4 show that the coe¢ cients on
"Explicit contracts" and "Implicit contracts" are not statistically di⁄erent from zero for
either of the four shocks. Thus, although these variables may play a role in explaining
the existence of price adjustment lags following signi￿cant demand or cost shocks, they
do not seem to have a bearing on the length of these lags.
In contrast, the type of pricing policy (single price versus price discrimination and
existence of quantity discounts) emerges as playing an important role in determining
the speed of price adjustments. Firms that decide the price on a case-by-case basis,
or do quantity discounts, tend to be faster to adjust to both cost and demand shocks.
In particular, from Table 5 we see that, for a ￿rm that sets its price on a case-by-case
basis, the probability of adjusting its price in response to a demand shock more than
one year after the shock is 12 to 14 percentage points (pp) lower than the probability
for an otherwise identical ￿rm (approximately 8 to 10 pp lower in the case of a ￿rm that
does quantity discounts). These results can be interpreted as re￿ ecting the fact that
￿rms with such ￿ exible pricing practices are likely to face relatively low information,
managerial, or menu costs, which also allow them to react more quickly to shocks.
Finally, we consider two variables related to the ￿rms￿lack of autonomy in setting
their own prices (as opposed to cases in which the price is set by the ￿rm itself). We
￿nd that the ￿price set by customers￿variable has a positive and signi￿cant impact
only in the case of positive cost shocks, suggesting that for these ￿rms customers have
enough power to delay the ￿rms￿reaction when costs push prices up. Regarding the
￿price set by competitors￿variable, our results show that ￿rms that have their prices
signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the main competitors are faster to respond to demand shocks
17than ￿rms that set their own prices. According to Table 5, the probability of such a
￿rm adjusting the price more than one year after the shock is 10 to 13 pp lower than
for a ￿rm in the reference category. This suggests that ￿rms whose prices are set by the
main competitors may be acting as market followers in a market where the presence of
market leaders helps reducing, or even eliminating, potential coordination problems.
Cost structure
In order to test whether the cost structure matters for explaining the di⁄erences in
price adjustment lags, we included two variables that measure the importance of labour
costs and other input costs (intermediate inputs). From Tables 4 and 5 we see that the
shares of labour and intermediate input costs emerge as important factors in explaining
the price adjustment lags. Irrespective of the type of shock, ￿rms with a labour share
above the median tend to be slower to react to shocks.12 In contrast, ￿rms with a share
of intermediate input costs above the median tend to react more quickly to cost shocks
than otherwise similar ￿rms.
Cost structure is an important determinant of how ￿rms react to cost shocks. Under
very general conditions, pro￿t maximizing ￿rms would like to set their price equal to the
marginal cost plus a mark-up. Thus, for ￿rms following mark-up rules, the higher the
volatility of input prices, the higher will be the frequency with which they change their
prices. If input costs are relatively stable, such as wages which are changed on average
once a year, prices can also be expected to be relatively stable. On the contrary, if input
costs are highly volatile, in particular the price of some raw materials, the frequency
of price changes could be much higher. Thus, ceteris paribus, one may expect ￿rms
with higher labour cost shares to change their prices less frequently than ￿rms with
higher shares of intermediate inputs with more volatile prices. Our ￿ndings suggest
that this result translates into the speed of price adjustment to cost shocks: ￿rms with
a higher share of labour cost tend to be slower to react, while ￿rms with a higher share
of intermediate input costs tend to be faster (see also Altissimo et al., 2006).
12This is a very robust result that has been extensively documented in the literature for the frequency
of price adjustments (see, among other, Altissimo, Ehrmann and Smets, 2006, and the references
therein). Our results show that the same result is valid for the speed with which ￿rms react to shocks.
18As for demand shocks, we may expect a similar result. Infrequent wage changes give
rise to ￿ atter product supply curves for ￿rms with higher shares of labour costs, making
their optimal price less sensitive to demand shocks. Thus, we may expect ￿rms with
higher shares of labour costs to react slowly to demand shocks. This is con￿rmed by
our ￿ndings. In particular, from Table 5 we see that, for a ￿rm with a share of labour
costs above the median, the probability of taking more than one year to adjust its price
after a cost shock is about 7 to 9 pp higher than the corresponding probability for an
otherwise identical ￿rm. This di⁄erence in the probabilities increases to 11 to 12 pp in
the face of demand shocks.
Market environment
To characterize the market environment in which ￿rms operate, we use a direct mea-
sure of market competition (number of competitors equal to 5 or more), and information
on the main destination market (domestic vs. foreign market). According to the esti-
mated model, the degree of competition is a relevant factor in determining the speed
of price adjustment. Firms in more competitive environments tend to be faster to react
to shocks. Indeed, it is known that the more competitive a sector is, the more sensitive
pro￿ts are to sub-optimal prices. Thus, for given nominal adjustment costs (due for
instance to the presence of information or menu costs), stronger competition may be
expected to translate into quicker responses to shocks (see, for instance, Martin, 1993).
From Table 5 we see that, in the face of a demand shock (either positive or negative), the
probability of a ￿rm adjusting the price more than one year after the shock is reduced
by around 8.0 pp for ￿rms with ￿ve or more competitors.
Regarding the market destination variable, we ￿nd that the coe¢ cients of the covariate
that measures the importance of the domestic market are not statistically signi￿cant for
any of the four shocks. Thus, whether the ￿rm sells their products in the domestic
market or abroad does not seem to make a di⁄erence for the speed with which ￿rms
react to shocks.
Source of competitiveness
In order to investigate if the di⁄erent competitiveness factors a⁄ect the speed with
which ￿rms respond to shocks, we distinguish between price, quality, and delivery period,
19as alternative sources of competitiveness. We may think of these factors as re￿ ecting
di⁄erent product characteristics which translate into di⁄erent demand elasticities (higher
demand elasticity for ￿rms for which price is an important factor, and lower elasticity for
￿rms that value more the quality of the product or the delivery period).13 According to
Tables 4 and 5, ￿rms that consider price as an important factor of competitiveness tend
to adjust prices more quickly, while ￿rms that value more the quality of the product
or the delivery period as competitiveness factors tend to adjust their prices at a slower
pace in response to shocks (specially so, in face of demand shocks).
Type of good
In the data we have information regarding the sector where ￿rms operate (manufactur-
ing or services), and the destination of the product (￿nal vs. intermediate consumption).
As earlier results suggested (see Table 2), from Table 4 and 5 we ￿nd that ￿rms that
operate in the services sector are substantially slower to react to shocks than ￿rms that
operate in the manufacturing sector. In fact, for each of the four shocks, the covariate
"Services" shows up in Table 5 as the one with the largest impact on the estimated prob-
abilities, with marginal e⁄ects ranging from 15 to 24 pp. These results are consistent
with previous evidence on the frequency of price changes which suggested a signi￿cantly
higher degree of price stickiness in the services sector.
The speed of price adjustment also varies according to the type of market for the
product. Firms that sell their products to other ￿rms (intermediate goods) tend to be
quicker to adjust their prices than ￿rms whose products are mainly for ￿nal demand
(whose main destinations are wholesalers, retailers or consumers). These results may
re￿ ect the fact that services and ￿nal goods are typically more di⁄erentiated than man-
ufacturing and intermediate goods, respectively, and thus face a less elastic demand.
Other characteristics
The last group of variables we considered as potentially relevant to explain the di⁄er-
ences in the lags of price adjustment are the ￿rm size and the capital structure. In line
13Martin (1993) showed that the speed of price adjustment increases with the elasticity of demand,
that is, ￿rms react faster to shocks when the demand schedule facing them is ￿ atter. This same idea
was used by Gopinath and Itskhoki (2009) to show the link between the frequency of price adjustment
and exchange rate pass-through.
20with the ￿ndings from the previous section, size matters for the speed of price adjust-
ment. In the face of cost shocks, large ￿rms tend to be slower at adjusting their prices
than small ￿rms. This ￿nding probably indicates that ￿rm size is capturing some re-
maining ￿rm characteristics not explained by the included covariates, like the ￿ exibility
of the decision-making process.
As regards the capital structure, we ￿nd that ￿rms with a higher share of domestic
capital tend to adjust faster in the face of shocks (especially so in the face of cost shocks),
probably because, in contrast to what can be expected for foreign ￿rms, the decision
making process of domestic ￿rms resides inside the country allowing a prompter reaction
to shocks.
4.2 Symmetric or asymmetric response lags?
Because the consequences of monetary policy shocks might di⁄er depending on the
direction of the shock, it is interesting to study whether the lags of price adjustments to
cost and demand shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. There is now a vast theoretical
literature that focus on the question of whether prices are more sticky in response to
a shock that warrants a price decrease or to shocks in the opposite direction. Such
asymmetries may arise because of strategic behaviour (Hansen et al., 1996, Kavenock
and Widdows, 1998, Bhaskar, 2002, Devereux and Siu, 2007), adjustment costs under
trend in￿ ation (Tsiddon, 1993, Ball and Mankiw, 1994b, Ellingsen et al., 2006), search
models (Lewis, 2004, Yang and Ye, 2008, Bayer and Ke, 2009), capacity constraints
(Finn, 1996, Laxton et al., 1996, Loertscher, 2005), inattentive consumers (Chen et al.,
2008), or customer anger (Okun, 1981, Rotemberg, 2005, Anderson and Simester, 2010).
Importantly, there seems to be no theoretical unanimity as to whether prices will be
more sticky when moving up or down.
According to the preliminary analysis in Section 3, and in line with results found in
other countries, some asymmetry is expected because ￿rms seem to react more quickly to
positive than to negative cost shocks, and more slowly to positive than negative demand
shocks. However, tests of possible asymmetric reaction times were not performed in
Section 3, and therefore it is important to investigate this issue formally. In the context
21of our model, testing for symmetry entails comparing not only the coe¢ cients of the
di⁄erent covariates in the equations for the di⁄erent shocks, but also all other parameters
that are shock speci￿c.
Table 6 presents the results of the two tests for symmetry within shocks ￿positive and
negative cost shocks, and positive and negative demand shocks. The null of symmetry
is clearly rejected in both cases and therefore it can be concluded that ￿rms react
di⁄erently to negative and positive shocks. Table 6 also reports the results of two tests
for symmetry between shocks ￿positive shocks to costs and demand, and negative shocks
to costs and demand. Again, the null of symmetry is clearly rejected, suggesting that
￿rms adjust di⁄erently to positive cost and demand shocks, as well as to negative cost
and demand shocks.
Table 6 - Tests of symmetry
Symmetry within shocks Symmetry between shocks
Positive and Positive and Positive cost Negative cost
negative negative and demand and demand
cost shocks demand shocks shocks shocks
￿2(23) = 88:33 ￿2(23) = 78:29 ￿2(23) = 300:0 ￿2(23) = 95:88
(p = 0:000) (p = 0:000) (p = 0:000) (p = 0:000)
￿2(23) stands for the Wald test statistic with 23 degrees of freedom and p for
the corresponding p-value.
Combining the results of these formal tests with the evidence in Section 3, one may
be led to conclude that prices adjust more quickly upwards than downwards following
cost shocks, but more slowly upwards than downwards in reaction to demand shocks.
However, the results in Section 3 revealed strong heterogeneity in the way ￿rms react to
shocks and therefore the direction of the asymmetry may vary with the characteristics of
the ￿rms. In order to investigate this issue, we computed for ￿rms in the baseline group
the di⁄erences between the probability that the adjustment to di⁄erent shocks will take
more than a year, as well as the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences for each covariate relative to
the baseline group (obtained from Table 5). These results, which are displayed in Table
7, allow us to discuss the sources and direction of asymmetries within shocks (positive
22vs. negative cost or demand shocks) and between shocks (cost vs. demand positive or
negative shocks).
Table 7: Estimates of the di⁄erence between probabilities for the category
e yij = 6 for the baseline group, and di⁄erences with respect to this group.
Within shocks Between shocks
Positive - Negative Cost - Demand
Cost Demand Positive Negative



















































































































































Standard errors computed from analytical second derivatives are in parenthesis; **marks
signi￿cance at 5%; *marks signi￿cance at 10% level.
23When we compare the speed of adjustment to positive and negative cost shocks for
the baseline ￿rm, we ￿nd evidence of asymmetric response; the di⁄erence between the
probability that the adjustment takes more than a year for positive and negative shocks
is equal to ￿0:1955, and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This means that these ￿rms
react signi￿cantly faster to positive than to negative cost shocks. Nevertheless, this
result is only strictly valid for the baseline ￿rm we use. For example, if in our baseline
group we had included ￿rms whose price is set by customers, consider price as an
important factor of competitiveness, and produce intermediate goods, we would have
obtained a value very close to zero: 0:0094 = 0:1162+0:0437+0:0450￿0:1955. What we
take from these results is that there is evidence of asymmetric response to cost shocks,
but the degree and direction of this behaviour varies signi￿cantly across ￿rms.
For demand shocks, the asymmetry tests in Table 6 above, combined with the evidence
in Table 2, suggest that prices move more quickly in response to negative than to positive
shocks. However, the results in Table 7 do not provide clear evidence to support this
asymmetry, and do not identify covariates with a strong e⁄ect on it. This suggests that
di⁄erences in the probability that the price is adjusted more than one year after the
shock is not a good measure of the degree of asymmetry in this particular case.
Turning, ￿nally, to the di⁄erence between cost and demand shocks (see the last two
columns in Table 7), we conclude that the probability of a ￿rm in the baseline group
adjusting the price more than one year after the shocks is signi￿cantly lower for a positive
cost shock than for a positive demand shock, but that the di⁄erence is not signi￿cant
in the case of negative shocks. However, again, the direction of the asymmetry may be
reversed for ￿rms with particular characteristics, with several regressors being able to
contribute to this.
In summary, because the direction and magnitude of the asymmetries vary from ￿rm
to ￿rm, the relevance of the di⁄erent types of ￿rms in the economy will ultimately
determine whether prices adjust more quickly upwards or downwards, or if they are
quicker to react to cost or demand shocks. To the best of our knowledge, the result
that the sign and magnitude of the asymmetry depends on the characteristics of the
￿rms, on the market structure considered, and on the nature of the shock, is new in the
24literature and may explain the lack of unanimity of the current economic models with
respect to this issue.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates ￿rm-level price rigidities by using survey data to look into the
origins of lags of price adjustments to demand and cost shocks. Price adjustment lags
are a direct measure of intrinsic price rigidity and therefore may be seen as a better
measure of price stickiness than the commonly used frequency of price changes.
By estimating a panel-ordered probit model, we ￿nd that the lags of price adjustments
vary with the sector, product, and ￿rm characteristics, namely the cost structure of the
￿rm, the type of pricing policy, the competitive environment, the di⁄erent factors of
competitiveness, or the type of good. These factors, using the terminology in Ball and
Romer (1990), a⁄ect directly the degree of real rigidities, which in turn, determines the
speed at which ￿rms adjust their prices, for a given level of nominal adjustment costs
(or nominal frictions). In contrast to what one could expect, the fact that the ￿rm has
a large proportion of sales under written contracts, or whether the relation with the
customers is essentially of a long-term nature, does not have implications for the speed
with which ￿rms adjust prices following signi￿cant demand or cost shocks. Overall, the
￿ndings in this paper are consistent with the idea that di⁄erences in the speed of price
adjustments depend on the costs of changing nominal prices, as well as on the sensitivity
of the ￿rms￿pro￿ts to deviations from the optimal price.
Both for demand and cost shocks, statistical tests indicate that ￿rms react di⁄erently
to positive and negative shocks. Similarly, for shocks of the same sign, the evidence
shows that ￿rms react di⁄erently to cost and demand shocks. However, because these
asymmetries depend on the characteristics of the ￿rms, their general direction and mag-
nitude will depend on the relative importance of di⁄erent types of ￿rms in an economy.
A ￿rst implication of our results is related to the identi￿cation of in￿ ation leading
indicators. Because it is possible to identify the characteristics of the ￿rms that are
faster to react to shocks, it should be possible to identify in￿ ation risks earlier by
25monitoring closely the sectors where this type of ￿rms predominate, and thus construct
useful leading indicators of in￿ ation.
More important, however, are the implications of our results for macroeconomic mod-
els. Indeed, our ￿ndings suggest that monetary models should try to accommodate the
fact that the degree of price stickiness varies across ￿rms and that ￿rms react di⁄erently
to di⁄erent types of shocks. In particular, our results suggest that these models could
bene￿t from explicitly incorporating some of the characteristics of the ￿rms, namely the
structure of the market where they operate (services vs. manufacturing, intermediate
goods vs. ￿nal consumption goods) and their cost structure, as these are important
determinants of the degree of price stickiness. Consideration of these factors may help
to better understand the heterogeneous e⁄ects of monetary policy across regions and
sectors, as well as providing some information about possible changes of the e⁄ectiveness
of monetary policy as a result of structural changes in the fabric of the economy.
26APPENDIX A
In this appendix we explain in detail the panel-ordered probit with random e⁄ects
used in Section 4.
We are interested in modelling the response of each ￿rm to four di⁄erent shocks. These
four resposes are likely to depend on common unobserved ￿rm characteristics, suggesting
the use of a panel data set-up in which the four seemingly unrelated equations are linked
by a common random e⁄ect representing the unobserved ￿rm characteristics. However,
because we let di⁄erent covariates have di⁄erent coe¢ cients in di⁄erent equations, we
allow the impact of the random e⁄ects to be shock-speci￿c. Besides providing potential
e¢ ciency gains, the inclusion of the random e⁄ects with a ￿ exible distribution makes
the model more general and therefore less sensitive to distributional assumptions.
The resulting model is very similar to a standard ordered probit with the only dif-
ference being the fact that we take into account the panel structure of the data. As in
the common ordered probit, we assume that there is a latent variable, yi;j, which repre-
sents the time ￿rm i takes to react to a shock of type j. Recall that the di⁄erent types
of shocks are: 1) positive demand shock; 2) positive cost shock; 3) negative demand






i￿j + ￿jvi + "i;j
￿
; (A1)
where ￿j (￿) is a strictly increasing invertible function that is speci￿c to shocks of type j;
xi is a set of ￿rm characteristics whose impact, measured by vectors ￿j, is shock speci￿c;
vi is a non-observed ￿rm-e⁄ect whose impact, measured by ￿j, is shock speci￿c; and "i;j
is a non-observed stochastic term that is ￿rm and shock speci￿c.
Equation (A1) implies that wi;j = ￿
￿1




i￿j + ￿jvi + "i;j:
In our data, yi;j is not fully observed and instead we observe e yi;j, which is related to
wi;j as follows. For m = 1;2;:::;6;
e yi;j = m if ￿m￿1;j < wi;j < ￿m;j, (A2)
27where the constants ￿m;j are the limits of the intervals into which the domain of wi;j is
partitioned due to the fact that yi;j is observed as interval data.
At this point, two approaches can be followed. Because the price lags are reported
in the form of known time intervals, we could specify the form of ￿j (￿) and use this
information to determine the cut-o⁄ parameters ￿m;j. Alternatively, we can estimate
the cut-o⁄ parameters, which avoids the need to specify ￿j (￿). This is the approach we
follow because by not specifying ￿j (￿) the model gains an interesting degree of ￿ exibility.
Speci￿cally, for identi￿cation purposes, we set ￿0;j = ￿1, ￿1;j = 0, and ￿6;j = +1,
estimating freely the remaining four cut-o⁄ parameters.
In order to be able to estimate the parameters of the model, we need to make dis-
tributional assumptions on the unobserved random components. We start by assuming
that "i;jjxi;vi ￿ N (0;1), where the normalization of the variance to 1 implies no loss
of generality. Then, based on (A2), the conditional probability of observing e yi;j = m is
given by
Pr(e yi;j = mjxi;vi) = Pr(￿m￿1;j ￿ wi;j < ￿m;jjxi;vi)






















= hj (e yi;jjxi;vi);
where ￿(￿) denotes the normal distribution function. Assuming that the disturbances
"i;j are conditionally independent (given xi and vi) across i and j, we can write the
probability that for a certain ￿rm we observe (e yi;1 = m1;e yi;2 = m2;e yi;3 = m3;e yi;4 = m4)
as




Since we also do not observe vi, we need to integrate it out of hj (e yi;jjxi;vi) in order
to obtain an expression of the individual contribution to the likelihood that can be used






hj (e yi;jjxi;vi)g (vi)dvi;
28where ￿ denotes the vector of parameters of the model and g (￿) is the density function
of vi. Following Dhaene and Santos Silva (2010), we assume that g (vi) is such that
sinh
￿1 (￿vi)=￿ has a standard normal distribution.14 That is, the shape-parameter ￿
introduces additional ￿ exibility in the model by allowing the distribution of the random
e⁄ect component to have an unspeci￿ed degree of excess kurtosis. In the model presented
in Section 4, the estimate of ￿ is ￿0:5740 (s.e. 0:0944), indicating that the random-
e⁄ects have a distribution with substantial excess kurtosis.
Finally, in order to make the model operational it is necessary to de￿ne how the
integration is performed. In our application, this was done using 50-point Gauss-Hermite
integration.
APPENDIX B
In this Appendix we describe the covariates used in the ordered probit model whose
results are presented in Section 4, and provide the corresponding summary statistics.
All the covariates used in the model are dummy variables. The details are as follows:
Explicit contracts ￿Equal to one if the percentage of sales under written contracts is
larger than 50 percent of total sales.
Implicit contracts ￿Equal to one if the relationship with customers is essentially a
long-term one (more than one year).
Price discrimination ￿Equal to one if the price of the ￿rm￿ s product is decided on a
case-by-case basis.
Quantity discount ￿Equal to one if the price depends on the quantity sold but ac-
cording to a uniform price list.
Price set by customers ￿Equal to one if the price of the product is set by the ￿rm￿ s
main customer(s).
Price set by competitors ￿Equal to one if the price of the product is set by the ￿rm￿ s
main competitor(s).
Labour costs ￿Equal to one if the labour cost share is above the median of the sample.
14The use of this sort of transformation was pioneered by Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988).
29Intermediate input costs ￿Equal to one if the other input costs share is above the
median of the sample.
Competition ￿Equal to one if the number of ￿rm￿ s competitors is equal to 5 or bigger.
Domestic market ￿Equal to one if Portugal is the main destination market for the
￿rm￿ s product.
Price competitiveness ￿Equal to one if the ￿rm considers price as a very important
factor for competitiveness.
Quality competitiveness ￿Equal to one if the ￿rm considers quality as a very important
factor for competitiveness.
Delivery competitiveness ￿Equal to one if the ￿rm considers delivery period as a very
important factor for competitiveness.
Services ￿Equal to one if the ￿rm operates in the Services sector.
Intermediate goods ￿Equal to one if "other companies" is the main destination of
sales (as opposed to wholesalers, retailers, Government, consumers).
Size ￿Equal to one if the number of employees is larger than 250.
Capital structure ￿Equal to one if the share of domestic capital (owned by Portuguese
entrepreneurs) is larger than 50 percent.
Table A1 summarizes the relative importance in the sample of the above de￿ned
covariates. The entries in the Table record the share of ￿rms in each category, with the
exception of the labour and intermediate input costs, which represent the corresponding
average shares, and the capital structure, which represents the share of ￿rms whose
national capital accounts for 50 percent or more of total capital. For instance, from the
Table we see that around 83 percent of ￿rms have implicit contracts, i.e., they have an
essentially long-term relationship with customers, and that the distribution of implicit
contracts is relatively homogeneous across sectors and do not vary much with the size
of ￿rms. In contrast, only in about 25 percent of the ￿rms do formal contracts account
for 50 percent or more of total sales (explicit contracts), and its distribution varies
signi￿cantly across sectors and ￿rms￿size.
30Table A1: Main characteristics of the sample
(Share of ￿rms in each category in percentage)
Total Sectors Firms￿size
Manufacturing Services Small Large
Explicit contracts 25.5 23.9 40 23.6 36.1
Implicit contracts 82.6 83.3 76.7 82.0 86.5
Price discrimination 37.4 38.3 30.0 37.8 35.3
Quantity discount 41.0 42.2 30.0 40.8 42.1
Price set by customers 11.7 11.8 11.1 10.9 16.5
Price set by competitors 12.3 12.9 6.7 13.6 4.5
Labour costs(a) 27.3 26.2 36.8 27.6 25.2
Intermediate input costs(a) 39.3 43.1 5.1 39.2 40.3
Competition 76.0 74.8 86.7 79.0 58.6
Domestic market 68.4 66.3 87.8 70.5 56.4
Price competitiveness 59.5 61.4 42.2 59.2 60.9
Quality competitiveness 77.0 76.4 82.2 76.1 82.0
Delivery competitiveness 51.1 51.7 45.6 50.0 57.1
Intermediate goods 30.9 30.6 33.3 31.8 25.6
Size (large ￿rms) 15.0 14.5 18.9 ￿ ￿
Capital Structure(b) 88.2 87.6 93.2 90.4 75.4
(a)Average of labour or intermediate input cost share (percent);
(b)Share of ￿rms whose national capital accounts for 50 percent or more of total capital.
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